摘要 :
The Concept for Future Joint Operations (CFJO) expands the new operational concepts contained in Joint Vision 2010--Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Full-Dimensional Protection, and Focused Logistics--to provide a more det...
展开
The Concept for Future Joint Operations (CFJO) expands the new operational concepts contained in Joint Vision 2010--Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Full-Dimensional Protection, and Focused Logistics--to provide a more detailed foundation for follow-on capabilities assessments. The CFJO represents an important step toward the objective of achieving the right capabilities for the challenges the U.S. military will face in the 21st century. The development of this concept--the first phase of a comprehensive implementation process--should eventually transform the Joint Vision 2010 ideas into actual joint force capabilities that will give the U.S. military Full Spectrum Dominance. This document is the intellectual foundation for changes, and is intended to be a living document that will provide the initial basis for a variety of assessment activities.
收起
摘要 :
This Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) describes potential operational concepts through which the Joint Force of 2020 will defend the nation against a wide range of security challenges. Its purpose is to guide force dev...
展开
This Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) describes potential operational concepts through which the Joint Force of 2020 will defend the nation against a wide range of security challenges. Its purpose is to guide force development toward Joint Force 2020, the force called for by the new defense strategic guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. A capstone concept by definition articulates a high- order vision of how the future force will operate. It cannot by itself provide the detailed guidance necessary to realize the Joint Force of 2020. It can, however, describe the future operating environment, advance new concepts for joint operations, and suggest attributes that will define the future force. In this way, the CCJO aims to establish a bridge from the new strategic guidance to subordinate concepts, force development guidance, and follow-on doctrine.
收起
摘要 :
The leadership of the U.S. Army is often criticized for its failure to anticipate the next conflict and structure itself accordingly. Recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan serve to many as examples of conflicts for which the ...
展开
The leadership of the U.S. Army is often criticized for its failure to anticipate the next conflict and structure itself accordingly. Recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan serve to many as examples of conflicts for which the U.S. Army was woefully unprepared and forced to pay a steep price in terms of blood and treasure for that unpreparedness. Additionally, many assert that we are at an historical inflection point and the U.S. Army should divorce itself from Cold War thinking and organize to meet these new threats. Are such claims valid or are they merely the flavor of the day? This paper explores recent scholarship on the future of conflict to attempt to discern if the character of warfare is indeed changing and what those changes mean. It then continues to consider how those charged with providing for our nation's defense view future threats to U.S. security. Lastly, based on this exploration, it considers various threat orientations upon which to base the structure of the U.S. Army and some of their implications. This paper is written during a time of budgetary austerity and decreased funding for our nation's military. This austerity requires important decisions on the part of our military and national leaders. However, as resources remain finite under all economic circumstances, this paper seeks to address questions of capability as opposed to those of capacity. The capacity of the U.S. Army can and will fluctuate with the strategic and economic times. But capabilities are the important question here. Can the army of the most powerful nation in the world afford to seek efficiencies of cost and scale by eliminating its ability to conduct certain kinds of conflict? Or is it required instead to maintain the ability to act across the entire continuum of conflict?
收起
摘要 :
The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) is the overarching concept of the family of joint concepts that guides the development of future joint capabilities. Its purpose is to lead force development and employment primaril...
展开
The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) is the overarching concept of the family of joint concepts that guides the development of future joint capabilities. Its purpose is to lead force development and employment primarily by providing a broad description of how the future joint force will operate. Service concepts and subordinate joint operating, functional, and integrating concepts will expand on the CCJO solution. Interagency and multinational partners may use it to assess potential integration requirements and opportunities. The CCJO broadly describes how future joint forces are expected to operate across the range of military operations in 2012-2025 in support of strategic objectives. It applies to operations around the globe conducted unilaterally or in conjunction with multinational military partners and other government and nongovernment agencies. It envisions military operations conducted within a national strategy that incorporates all instruments of national power. This concept is applicable to combatant commands, the Military Services, Defense agencies, and the Joint Staff for concept development and experimentation. The CCJO briefly describes the environment and military problem expected to exist in 2012-2025 (from just outside the future years defense program to 20 years in the future). It proposes a solution to meet challenges across the range of military operations and describes key characteristics of the future joint force. This concept concludes by presenting risks and implications associated with this concept.
收起
摘要 :
In September of 2012, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff released A Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020 (CCJO) which lays out a concept of 'Globally Integrated Operations' that relies heavily on the indi...
展开
In September of 2012, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff released A Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020 (CCJO) which lays out a concept of 'Globally Integrated Operations' that relies heavily on the individual services to embrace Joint integration and collaboration despite clear cultural barriers that may make such cooperation difficult. The purpose of this thesis was to identify the primary service barriers to Joint integration and find solutions to overcome them. This study has determined that each of the services have developed their own unique cultures that have influenced their approach to Joint concepts. Through case studies it was revealed that these unique approaches can become friction points and even develop as barriers to change and Joint integration. The primary service barriers to the CCJO were identified as (1) Threat to Service Mission, (2) Threat to Service Identity and Independence, (3) Threat to Service Budget, and (4) Institutional Inertia. In finding solutions to overcome these barriers, it was discovered that a corporate solution such as the cultural analysis performed during mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures may be necessary to mitigate individual service resistance to implementing the Joint Force 2020 concept.
收起
摘要 :
As successful as the U.S. joint force has been in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's 'Capstone Concept for Joint Operations' (CCJO) outlines the need for change to sustain this success in future warf...
展开
As successful as the U.S. joint force has been in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's 'Capstone Concept for Joint Operations' (CCJO) outlines the need for change to sustain this success in future warfare. One key area of change should be in the roles and relationships among flag officer headquarters. U.S. military, Alliance, and Coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are characterized by multiple command headquarters inside and outside the theaters of operation. This current situation is likely to be replicated in future conflicts. Ensuring that each echelon, and each headquarters, provides truly complementary effects is critical to future success. This paper recommends actions for those headquarters out of theater that, once adopted, can ensure that the joint force gains added value from those headquarters out of theater that are supporting the theater commander. The CCJO's precepts for future joint operations establish the framework for change, and an examination of the existing NATO and U.S. chains of command in Afghanistan establish a starting point for that change. Finally, the paper concludes with a series of recommendations to better focus the efforts of these multiple echelons of command.
收起
摘要 :
This process-refinement experiment examined how to build a multinational operational net assessment (ONA) using a distributed, collaborative information environment (CIE), as well as information release issues among coalition part...
展开
This process-refinement experiment examined how to build a multinational operational net assessment (ONA) using a distributed, collaborative information environment (CIE), as well as information release issues among coalition partners. Additionally, it as ...
收起
